

*Draft prepared for Panel 4, The Values Question and American Politics, of the
Conference on "Christian Conservatives and American Democracy."
Russell Sage Foundation, New York, April 27-29, 2007.*

All comments appreciated.

VOTING YOUR VALUES AND RACE

April 2007

Wayne E. Baker

University of Michigan

Connie J. Boudens

University of Michigan

*The data for this study come from the 2003 Detroit Area Study, funded in part by the University of Michigan and the Russell Sage Foundation.

VOTING YOUR VALUES AND RACE

Abstract

Controversial exit polls from the 2004 elections reported that “values voters” swung the election in favor of George W. Bush. The controversy about “values voters” is an indication of questions about the changing social bases of political behavior. American politics appears to be becoming less social structural (membership in groups based on class, religion, gender, race, etc.) and more cultural (shared values that cut across groups). Using data from the 2003 Detroit Area Study, we analyze the effects of race, social class, religion, and values on the likelihood of voting, on choice of presidential candidate, and party identification. Our innovation is to use “better measures” (Layman 1997) of values and assess their effects on political behavior. We show that two values scales (traditional versus secular-rational values and survival versus self-expression values) are significantly related to voting, presidential choice, and party identification, though other factors—especially race—continue to exert strong effects. In the Detroit region, the effects on political behavior of values and race are more important than religious behavior (frequency of church attendance), or household income.

VOTING YOUR VALUES AND RACE

The 2004 elections raised anew questions about values and the vote. The National Election Pool (NEP) exit poll reported that “moral values” was the top issue for voters, with 22 percent picking it as “the one issue that mattered most in deciding how you voted for president” (Moore 2004). Eighty percent of those who chose moral values said they voted for Bush, only 18 percent for Kerry. Some commentators seized this finding to claim that “values voters” decided the election in favor of Bush, but some polling experts questioned this interpretation. For example, ABC’s Director of Polling Gary Langer argued that the NEP item was a “poorly devised exit poll question” and it produced a misleading result (Moore 2004). Christopher Muste, senior polling analyst at the *Washington Post*, offers another criticism, based on the national exit polls conducted by the *Los Angeles Times* since 1992 (Muste 2004). In the 2004 exit poll, 40 percent selected “moral/ethical values” as one of their two most important issues, but this figure is about the same as in the previous two presidential elections: 35 percent in 2000, and 40 percent in 1996. Moreover, fewer “moral values voters” cast their vote for Bush in 2004 than they did in 2000. And, Bob Dole actually got more of the “values voters” in 1996 than Bush did in either 2000 or 2004. Based on these and other results, Muste (2004) concludes that “values voters” are nothing more than a “myth.”

The controversy about the role of “values voters” is an indication of fundamental questions about the changing social bases of political behavior. As elaborated below, scholars distinguish between social structural bases (membership in groups based on class, religion, gender, or race) and cultural bases (shared values that cut across groups). Both matter, but American politics appears to be becoming more cultural and less social

structural (e.g., Layman and Carmines, 1997). This study contributes to research on the cultural or “values” bases of political behavior and attitudes by responding to the call for “better measures” of values (Layman, 1997:307). We employ two scales that measure values in a deeper way than has been done in previous studies of political behavior. These scales are well-tested in research on values in America (Baker, 2005; Baker and Forbes, 2006) and in cross-cultural research (e.g., Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Norris and Inglehart, 2004). We show how positions on these scales—traditional versus secular-rational values and survival versus self-expression values—are related to voting, presidential vote, and party identification, controlling for a host of social structural variables.

We use data from the 2003 Detroit Area Study on information and values in society. This study was designed with these “better measures” of values in mind, using survey items that are identical to those used by others to create the two values scales (references above). The city of Detroit and its surrounding suburbs are remarkable in the extent to which they are racially segregated. Detroit is the single most segregated metropolitan area in the country and is home to the nation’s most isolated black population, although this racial segregation also extends to the surrounding counties on a neighborhood-by-neighborhood basis (Farley, Danzinger, and Holzer, 2000; Baker and Coleman, 2004). For example, the 2001 Detroit Area Study (DAS) revealed that while 81 percent of the population of the city of Detroit identified as African-American, this figure was 4 percent, 4 percent and 1 percent for Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb counties respectively. The mass exodus of white city residents from the city of Detroit to the suburbs that began after the Detroit Riot of 1967, stabilizing after about 1980 not only

changed the demographic composition of the city, but its economic base (Thompson, 1999). According to the 2001 DAS, the median annual household income in Detroit as \$52,450 compared to an average of \$75,600 in Wayne, Oakland and Macomb counties. Thirty-two percent of the Detroit households in this survey also had a median household income of less than \$30,000, compared to 10 percent, 8 percent and 10 percent in Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb counties respectively. Therefore, although the Detroit Area Studies are based on representative samples from the city of Detroit and the surrounding counties, it is important to recognize that the sample cannot be generalized to the entire country. An advantage of using the Detroit Area Study is that we can examine the effects of the extremes of racial and income segregation, and to compare these effects with the effects of values on political behavior.

STRUCTURAL AND CULTURAL BASES OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

Scholars make a distinction between the social structural and cultural bases of political behavior. The social structural approach argues that members of the same social group, based on, for example, class, race, or religion, tend to have similar political beliefs and to vote the same way. The cultural approach argues that values shared across diverse groups are the basis of political behavior. Below we summarize some of the key empirical findings about both approaches, and derive hypotheses that we test with data from the 2003 Detroit Area Study.

Race

Beginning around the time of the 1964 presidential election, the Democratic Party came to be seen as the more racially liberal party, and the Republican as the more racially

conservative (Carmines and Stimson, 1989). This change is coincident with a pattern of movement in which whites have offered greater and greater support to the Republicans, while most racial and ethnic minorities have moved toward the Democrats (Bowler, Nicholson and Segura, 2006), a pattern that Carmines and Stimson (1989) explain using changes in the parties' positions on racial issues. The South has contributed disproportionately to the movement of whites. Hutchings and Valentino (2004) note that support for Democrats dropped in the South, starting in the mid 60's, and that this is largely due to the defection of Southern whites, particularly native-born Southern whites. According to Valentino and Sears, (2005) this is definitely a case of realignment rather than dealignment, as the reduction in Southern whites who identify as Democrat has been met with an equal increase in those who identify as Republicans.

Overall, race-party alignments appear to be relatively stable. Whites are slightly more Republican than Democrat, blacks are almost overwhelmingly Democrats, and Latinos continue to support Democrats despite a slight movement toward the Republicans in the 2004 general election (Pew Hispanic Center, 2006). Young native-born Southern whites are now largely Republican from the start (Valentino and Sears, 2005), and while this may result in intergenerational replacement leading Southern whites becoming even more closely tied to the Republicans, whether this will result any discernable realignment at the national level has yet to be determined. Other than this, there is little expectation that there will be significant class-part realignments in the near future.

Given the racial composition of the Detroit region, we are particularly interested in the political behaviors of black citizens. The research summarized above leads us to hypothesize that:

H1: Relative to whites, black voters were more likely to vote against Bush in the 2000 election and to identify as other than Republican, controlling for other factors.

Social Class

Early studies of the relationship between social class and voting in the industrialized nations of the West found that people in the lower classes were more likely to vote for left-wing political parties than were people in the higher classes, although this relationship was found to be far weaker in the United States than in many other countries (Evans, 2000). There is evidence to support the notion that class has since decreased in importance as a determinant of political behaviors in industrialized nations (see, for example, Achterberg, 2006, and Bartle, 1998). Other research, however, indicates that this is not the case: that verifiable changes in the relationship between social class and political behavior are *not* part of an overall trend, and that in many cases they may represent more of a *realignment* than a *dealignment* (see Manza, Hout and Brooks, 1995 for a review). The South appears to be an exceptional case, with Southern whites having grown increasingly divided along partisan lines depending on their social class (as measured by either income or education), although the extent to which it trumps race and ethnicity remains the subject of much debate (Nadeau et al, 2004).

Historically, economic cleavages have played large roles in presidential vote choice. Those in the upper third of the income distribution, for example, tend to vote Republican while those in the lower third tend to vote Democratic (Fiorina with Abrams

and Pope 2005:70-72). Recent elections have spurred considerable debate about the decline of economic cleavages as determinants of vote choice. Based on their analysis of data from the American National Election Studies, Fiorina with Abrams and Pope 2005:72) argue that “[c]laims about the demise of economic cleavages in American elections are true only if one limits one’s focus to the drop-off from 1996 to 2000.”

Greeley and Hout (2006) found that although household income affects vote choice and partisanship in all denominations, the correspondence between class and political behavior is much greater for conservative Christians. Greeley and Hout (2006) further offer evidence that indicates household income outweighs religious denomination as a predictor of both vote choice and party affiliation. Issues around the methods and measures used to investigate the relationship between class variables and political behaviors have brought previous findings into question (Evans, 2000). For example, Stonecash et al (2000) suggested that the use of self-identified class does not adequately represent the economic reality of the respondents and instead used relative income to gain new insights about voting outside the South. Hout, Brooks, and Manza (1995) also made interesting new discoveries by looking at subsections of the middle class instead of regarding the middle class as one group, and de la Garza and Cortina (2007) found that income and education level had differential effects on predicting vote choice in Latinos.

Given these previous findings, we expect that our analysis of the DAS data will show that:

H2: The more formal education a person has, the more likely he/she was to vote against Bush in the 2000 election and to identify as other than Republican, controlling for other factors.

H3: The higher an individual's household income, the more likely he/she was to vote for Bush in the 2000 election and to identify as Republican, controlling for other factors.

H4: The more formal education an evangelical Protestant has, the more likely he/she was to vote against Bush in the 2000 election, controlling for other factors.

H5: The higher an evangelical Protestant's household income, the more likely he/she was to vote for Bush in the 2000 election, controlling for other factors.

Religion

Although 1992 is thought to be the first “culture war” election, the current alignments between political parties and religious traditions are the result of a process that began around 1960 (Kellstedt et al, 1996; Kohut et al, 2000), at which time the traditionalist-modernist divide that already existed in American religion began to impact on partisan politics (Layman, 2001). Layman argues that the growing numbers of secularists and religious liberals in the 1960's and 1970's influenced traditionalists to mobilize, and that this is one of the factors that led to the religious cleavages we see today. Kohut et al (2000) also believe that the closer relationship between religion and politics is *not* the result of a great spiritual awakening, citing as evidence the fact that

evangelicals have not vastly increased in number, nor have the religious practices and beliefs of this group changed substantially. They speculate that the increase in political involvement on the part of committed white Christians is a reaction to the increased secularization of society. In any case, an increase in religiosity itself is not at the root of the divide. There is empirical support for this idea in Campbell (2006). Campbell extends the racial threat literature to religious affiliation and finds support for the hypothesis that evangelicals respond to the threat of more secularists in their communities by voting Republican. For both the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections, there is a positive relationship between the proportion of the community that is secularist, and the probability that the evangelicals in that community voted Republican. There is also evidence that a parallel phenomenon has come to influence the attitudes and behaviors of people who oppose fundamentalists, in that their political behaviors are a reaction to the increasingly visible presence of fundamentalist Christians (Bolce and de Maio, 1999a, 1999b)

The overall picture of the bonds between religious traditions and political parties is difficult to paint in simple strokes. This is partly because the main outcome variable in models of alignment can be ideology, partisanship, or voting. Many studies run separate analyses using each of these as the dependent variable, and the only thing that is patently clear is that these outcomes are somewhat differentially impacted. In addition, religious groups change in size over the years and have differential and varying rates of voter turnout. An additional complicating issue is the fact that different studies of political behavior cover different and overlapping time periods and use different methodologies and controls (Woodberry and Smith, 1998) With this said, the basic changes in alignment

of religious traditions with political parties are listed below by religious tradition, and then by political party.

Catholics: In terms of partisanship, Catholics have moved from high level of Democratic identification to a more independent orientation in recent years (Brooks and Manza, 2004, Layman, 2001). In terms of voting, Catholics gave more support to the Democrats during the early 1960's, probably due to Kennedy's candidacy (Layman, 2001), but then reestablished and maintained a moderate, steady level of support for the Republican party over the 1972 -2000 period (Brooks and Manza, 2004), and voted Republican marginally more in 2000 than in 2004 (Langer and Cohen, 2005).

Mainline Protestants: Committed mainline Protestants, who historically were largely Republican continued to identify as Republican from 1960 to the late 1990's, while their less committed counterparts remained more-or-less equally divided among the three major political affiliations (Layman, 2001). However, changes in the size of this group overall had an effect on voting for Republicans.

Evangelical Protestants: With regards to partisanship, evangelicals, who were strongly Democratic in 1960, began to withdraw their support in about 1964, and identified as Republican at an increasing rate from about 1978 (Layman, 2001). It is important to note that the pattern of partisanship differs depending on religious commitment. The preceding applies primarily to committed evangelicals. Evangelicals who are not regular church goers, in contrast, have not realigned with the Republicans although they did also withdraw their support from the Democrats. For the most part, they have continued to identify as Independents (Layman, 2001). For voting, evangelical Protestants have been steady in their support of Republicans since at least 1972, with the

exception of a brief increase in Democratic voting during the Carter years (Brooks and Manza, 2004, Layman, 2001).

Jews: Jews have traditionally affiliated with the Democratic party, and with the exception of a brief period in the 1980's during which they identified more as Independents, have continued to strongly support the Democratic side (Layman, 2001).

Seculars: Seculars have remained steady in their identification as Independents from at least 1960. In terms of voting, they have remained slightly on the Democratic side (Layman, 2001) with some fluctuation over the years (Layman, 1999)

Composition of Republican supporters: Evangelicals and seculars now form a larger portion of Republican supporters, primarily because of the increased sizes of these groups, and because of lowered support from mainline Protestants and the fact that a smaller proportion of the electorate is made up of mainline Protestants. At the beginning of the 1972-2000 period, they made up 50 percent of all Republican voters, but this had dropped to only about 25 percent at the end of the period (Brooks and Manza, 2004). Evangelicals are now the largest religious group in the Republican coalition (Layman, 2001), having replaced mainline Protestants as the Republican party's most loyal supporters in 1992 (Kellstedt et al, 1996). Growth in Republican party identification from 1964 – 1996 was greatest among committed evangelical Protestants, followed other evangelical Protestants and committed Catholics (Kohut et al, 2000). At 2006, this alignment of evangelicals and committed members of other religious groups with the Republicans had persisted (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2006a)

Composition of Democratic supporters: The religious base of support for Democrats has remained fairly stable. The biggest change has been lowered support of

mainline Protestants, due in part to decreased size of this group, and in part to changes in voting behavior. (Brooks and Manza, 2004) Seculars form a larger portion of Democratic supporters, due to the increased size of this group ((Brooks and Manza, 2004)

Overall, religion-based differences in vote choice indicate that there has actually been a small (15 percent) decline in the religion cleavage over the 1972 to 2000 period. This is attributable to changes in voting behavior of mainline Protestants (Brooks and Manza, 2004). This might lead one to conclude that the effects of religion-based cleavages in politics are decreasing, and this might be the case if it were not for the differences in the political behavior of highly committed versus less committed members of each religious tradition. In their analysis of data from the 1988 election, Kellstedt et al (1991) found that religious commitment (as measured by church attendance, the importance of religion to the individual, attitudes toward the Bible, and born-again identification) was related to Republican partisanship for both mainline and evangelical Protestants. Religious commitment also influenced voter turnout for all categories of Protestants, except for Presbyterians. With the exception of Southern Baptists, religious commitment was also related to voting Republican. In more recent research, Brooks and Manza (2004) found that religious commitment (as measured by church attendance alone) was associated with disproportionately higher levels of support for Republican candidates for evangelical Protestants only. The Pew Research Center (2006) further refers to a widening “God Gap” between the two major parties, pointing out that while the Republican party held onto frequent churchgoers in the 2006 mid-term elections, Democrats made gains among voters who rarely or never attend religious services. One

interesting exception is African Americans, who appear to be affected by religious commitment in the opposite directions from whites. African Americans who attend religious services and read scripture more often are more likely to vote Democrat than Republican (Greeley and Hout, 2006).

Given prior findings, we expect that our analysis of the DAS data will indicate that:

H6: Evangelical Protestants are more likely to have voted for Bush in the 2000 election and to identify as Republican, controlling for other factors.

H7: Catholics are more likely to have voted against Bush in the 2000 election, and to identify as other than Republican, controlling for other factors.

H8: Seculars are more likely to have voted for Bush in the 2000 election, and to identify as Republican, controlling for other factors.

H9: The more frequently someone attends religious services, the more likely they are to have voted for Bush in the 2000 election, and to identify as Republican, controlling for other factors.

H10: The more frequently an African-American attends religious services, the more likely he/she is to have voted *against* Bush in the 2000 election

and to identify as *other* than Republican, controlling for other factors.

Moral Issues and Values

The 2004 National Election Pool (NEP) exit poll, conducted for a consortium of media organizations, propelled moral values to the forefront of public discussion about the forces that drive political behavior. The poll asked voters to select from a predetermined list “the one issue that mattered most in deciding how you voted for president.” Twenty-two percent of those voters selected “moral values.” The other issues included economy/jobs (20 percent), terrorism (19 percent), Iraq (15 percent), healthcare (8 percent), taxes (5 percent), and education (4 percent).

The voters who selected this item as their greatest concern also heavily favored Bush, and a large percentage of them were conservative white evangelicals, leading to the widespread perception that attitudes toward moral issues among conservative Christians played a major role in Bush’s reelection (Langer and Cohen, 2005). By now the NEP exit poll data have been examined and reanalyzed in multiple ways, to reveal that this popular perception is not supported by more sophisticated analyses of the data (see for example Hillygus and Shields, 2005; Klinkner, 2006; Langer and Cohen, 2005). However, the “moral values” question in the National Election Pool exit poll may have more validity than many critics think and could indicate the rising importance of “moral values” in future elections (Schuman, 2006). Nonetheless, the media coverage of this aspect of the exit poll, and the rhetoric that attaches itself so readily to simple, salient statistics added to the widespread perception in America that the citizenry is sharply divided with respect

to moral issues (see, e.g., Baker 2005), and that this division is related to, or at least complicated by, the bonds between religious denominations and specific political parties.

Abortion and gay rights were seen as the “hot-button” moral issues behind the 2004 exit poll controversy (Lovett and Jordan, 2005), and are the key moral issues that the public perceive to sharply divide them. There is ample evidence, however, that indicates that Americans are more similar in their attitudes toward these issues than they are polarized (Baker 2005; Fiorina with Abrams and Pope, 2006). For example, Tamney, Johnson, and Burton (1992) surveyed 400 residents of Muncie Indiana about their attitudes toward abortion. Ten percent said abortion should never be allowed, 26.2 percent said it should never be forbidden, and the balance said it should be allowed under certain circumstances. These findings are largely consistent with Gallup polls conducted from 1975 to 1988, which indicated that the majority of people fall in between the two extremes, as well as with numbers from the 1992 ANES (Abramowitz, 1995).

Attitudes toward gay rights appear to vary depending on the legislation under consideration. Although employment rights for homosexuals no longer seem to be a point of contention (Fiorina with Abrams and Pope, 2006), the morality (or lack thereof) of sexual relations between two people of the same sex, as well as civil unions and marriage between homosexuals is still hotly debated. Evaluating the role of gay rights in creating or maintaining a cleavage with respect to moral issues is more difficult than with abortion for at least two reasons. First, irrespective of the rhetoric that would suggest that attitudes toward abortion are dichotomous (Layman, 2001), options in abortion legislation fall along a natural continuum, from always legal, to legal in cases of rape, incest and so on, to legal only if the mother’s life is in danger, to never legal. Matters related to gay rights,

however, are more dichotomous. One is either for or against them. One could argue that civil unions are simply a less objectionable version of marriage, and the research does indicate that there is greater approval for civil unions than for outright marriage between people of the same sex (Brewer and Wilcox, 2005), but the options for legislation are not as easy to arrange as a scale. The second reason for the added difficulty of looking for cleavages in attitudes toward gay rights is that there appears to be a more complex set of values underlying these attitudes. Individualism, equality, and traditional values are all implicated, and it is possible for people to have opinions about gay rights based on more than more than one of these values, potentially leading to a degree of ambivalence about gay rights overall (Craig et al, 2005).

Despite these difficulties, Fiorina (with Abrams and Pope, 2006) conclude that while Democrats and Republicans differ with respect to gay rights, the differences are not as extreme as they are popularly assumed to be, and that part of the perception that there is a divide is because people confuse “closely divided” with “deeply divided”. Further, Craig et al conclude that: “Like most issues, the conflict over gay rights is typically presented in bipolar terms. With gay and lesbian groups at one end of the spectrum pitted against social conservatives at the opposite end; differences between the two groups seem impossible to resolve because of the vast ideological gulf separating them. Yet our findings indicate that the extremity of interest group politics masks a substantial middle ground of ordinary people with attitude structures more complex than standard survey questions lead us to believe.” (2005:15). National surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, and the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life support this notion, finding that a large percentage of Americans are comfortable

taking the middle ground on issues that are considered very divisive, including abortion (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2006b)

Abramowitz (1995) further notes that many of the people who identify with a particular political party hold attitudes that are at odds with party activists and elites. Given this, even divisive opinions on key issues may not have a significant impact at the polls. Fiorina (with Abrams and Pope, 2006) also highlight the fact that a great deal of the research in the area of political behavior is based on the activities and opinions of political activists who are not representative of the general population, and that this may exacerbate the perception that the citizenry is engaged in a war over moral issues. In any event, a large body of evidence indicates that, contrary to popular belief, the 2004 election was decided on issues *other* than moral issues (Ashbee, 2005; Hillygus and Shields, 2005; Klinkner, 2006; Langer and Cohen, 2005)

Clearer and more meaningful patterns may emerge by focusing our attention on the level of values rather than specific attitudes such as those mentioned above. Values are more abstract than, and superordinate to attitudes, serving as the broader base from which attitudes often arise (Ajzen, 2001; Baker, 2005). Focusing on values instead of attitudes also permits us to arrange the motivations for political behaviors along continua, allowing for a better understanding of the relationships among values and how they relate to political behaviors within and between cultures.

One widely used taxonomy of human values, originally proposed by Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, 1990) and subsequently revised by Schwartz (1992, 1994), posits that there are ten value types, which can be arranged in a circumplex structure around two basic dimensions. The first is openness to change vs. conservation, which emphasizes

independence of thought and action on one end, with submission to authority, traditionalism, and security on the other. The second dimension, self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence sets values concerning equality and social welfare up against the pursuit of one's status relative to others. This theoretical structure of values has extensive, cross-national empirical support, and has been used to explain political and religious behaviors. Devos, Spini, and Schwartz (2002), for example, found that trust in institutions, such as government, was positively correlated with values such as security, conformity and tradition, which would fall on the conservation side of the circumplex, and negatively related to values such as self-direction. They also found that religious individuals were more likely to favor submission to a higher authority, and to have respect for traditional views than secular persons did. Right-wing political orientation was also found to be associated with a desire to maintain the current social structure and to exercise control over others, while left-wing orientation was found to be associated with concern for the welfare of others and rejection of inequality.

While Schwartz and his colleagues sought to identify the universal aspects of the structure of human values, Ronald Inglehart and colleagues were concerned with identifying dimensions of cross-cultural variation, using data from the World Values Survey, the largest systematic attempt ever made to document values, attitudes, and beliefs around the world. Two dimensions emerge from the analysis: a continuum of traditional versus secular-rational values, and a continuum of survival versus self-expression values. The first dimension taps a constellation of values about God, country, and family. Traditional values emphasize the importance of religion and God, patriotism and nationalism, absolute standards of morality, and deference to authority. These values

include pro-life/pro-family values, manifested, for example, as opposition to abortion, divorce, euthanasia, and suicide, and the belief that it is more important for children to learn obedience and religious faith than determination and independence. Secular-rational values emphasize the opposite positions on all these topics.

The second dimension—survival versus self-expression values—represents a fundamentally different orientation: a constellation of values about security, materialism, interpersonal trust, tolerance of others, well-being, and political activism. Survival values emphasize economic stability, physical security, and domestic order above all else. Survival values are expressed as distrust of outgroups, immigrants, and foreigners, as well as low levels of political activity, fear of ethnic diversity and cultural change, and low subjective well-being. Self-expression values emphasize the opposite. Self-expression values are expressed in high levels of political activity and concerns about human rights, the quality of life, and the environment. Self-expression values relate to what Fogel (2000:176-7) calls “spiritual” or “immaterial” needs.

These two dimensions are robust. They emerged from analysis of 43 societies included in the first two waves of the World Values Surveys, 1981 and 1990 (Inglehart 1997); they also emerged from analysis of 65 societies once the third wave (1995) was added (Inglehart and Baker 2000), as well as from analysis of 80 societies when the fourth wave (2000) was included (Inglehart and Norris 2003)—although the broader coverage in each successive wave increased the cultural and economic diversity of the societies analyzed.

Each dimension is correlated in sensible ways with dozens of additional items (Inglehart and Baker 2000:26-7), lending further support to the validity of these

dimensions. For example, those with traditional values tend to believe in heaven, hell, and life after death; they find comfort and strength from religion; they frequently attend religious services and have confidence in the nation's religious institutions; they emphasize work over leisure; and, their political ideology leans to the right. Those with secular-rational values take the opposite position on all of these topics. People with survival values tend to be dissatisfied with their financial situations and emphasize a good income and a safe job versus a feeling of accomplishment and working with people one likes; they tend to give lower ratings to their overall health; they do not support women's rights; and, they believe the government should take more responsibility for people. Those with self-expression values emphasize the opposite.

Originally developed to examine variations across cultures, these dimensions can be used to look at variations within cultures and the relationship of values to political behaviors within cultures (e.g., Baker 2005; Baker and Forbes 2006; Baker and Jamal 2007). The items used to determine these two dimensions were included in the 2003 Detroit Area Study, allowing us to examine the relationship between these values and political behavior. (See Data and Measures for additional details on these two values dimensions.)

H11: The more traditional a person's values are, the more likely that person voted for Bush in the 2000 election, and to identify as Republican, controlling for other factors.

H12: The more survival oriented a person's values are, the more likely that person is to have voted for Bush in the 2000 election, and to identify as

Republican, controlling for other factors.

Finally, because political action is a component of self-expression, we expect that more self-expression oriented people will be more likely to vote, compared to those who are more survival oriented.

H13: The more self-expression oriented a person's values are, the more likely that person is to have voted in the 2000 election, controlling for other factors.

DATA AND MEASURES: 2003 DETROIT AREA STUDY

Data

The study population is defined to include all adults who were 18 years and older and resided in households in the Detroit three-county metropolitan area during the survey period, April to August 2003. The geographic area of the survey population includes Wayne, Oakland and Macomb counties in Michigan. The survey population includes only eligible adults living in households. Individuals in institutions, living in group quarters or on military bases are excluded from the survey population. The DAS is an area probability sample based on a conventional three-stage sample design: a primary stage sample of area segment units followed by a second stage sample of housing units within area segments, and a third stage random selection of one eligible adult respondent in households with one or more eligible persons.

The sample size for the DAS is 508. The AAPOR response rate is 56.6 percent, which is about the same as the average response rate for the 1997 – 2001 DAS studies

(Clemens, Couper, and Powers 2002). Sampling weights were constructed to account for variation in probabilities of selection and non-response rates, and to adjust sample results to match known Census totals for the Detroit three-county area for age, gender, and race. The probabilities of selection varied because a single adult was selected from each household, in effect over-representing in the sample persons who live in households with fewer adults. Non-response rates were higher in some areas than others, and the inverse of the response rates in sample areas was used as an adjustment factor. Post-stratification weights were developed so that the final weighted estimates agreed with Census distributions by age, gender, and race for the metropolitan area. A rescaled final weight, which is the product of all three adjustments, was computed which sums to the unweighted sample size of 508. All analyses employ the final rescaled weight.

Dependent Variables

The dependent variables are three dummy variables: (1) Voted in 2000 elections (1 = yes, 0 = no); (2) voted for Bush (1 = yes, 0 = other), and (3) identify as Republican (1 = yes, 0 = other).¹ About 90 percent of the 508 respondents were eligible to vote in 2000, based on U.S. citizenship and age (18 or older in 2000). Of these, about 77 percent voted in the 2000 general elections. The majority (55.3 percent) voted for Gore, 42.3 percent for Bush, and 2.3 percent voted for Ralph Nader or someone else. Among all 508 respondents, about 21 percent identified as Republican, 41 percent as Democrat, 23 percent as independent, and 15 percent indicated other or no preference.

Independent Variables

¹ A potential limitation of the voting data is the passage of time between the 2000 elections and the 2003 survey, and hence the possibility that voters forgot or over-report their vote (Belli, Traugott, Young, and McGonagle 1999).

The independent variables are grouped into (1) religious affiliation, (2) race, (3) socioeconomic class, (4) values, and (5) political ideology.

(1) Religious affiliation is a set of dummy variables, where Mainline Protestant = 1, 0 = otherwise; Evangelical Protestant = 1, 0 = otherwise; Catholic = 1, 0 = otherwise; Other religions = 1, 0 = otherwise; and, Secular (no religious affiliation) = 1, 0 = otherwise. Mainline Protestant is the omitted category in the multivariate analyses.

(2) Race is a single dichotomous variable, where 1 = Black and 0 = nonblack, using the U.S. Census categories for race.

(3) Socioeconomic class is indicated by education (1 = less than high school, 2 = some high school, 3 = completed high school or GED, 4 = some college or completed college, 5 = graduate or professional degree) and household income (1 = less than \$10,000, 2 = \$10,000 to \$14,999, 3 = \$15,000 - \$19,999, 4 = \$20,000 – \$29,999, 5 = \$30,000 - \$49,999, 6 = \$50,000 - \$74,999, 7 = \$75,000 - \$99,999, 8 = \$100,000 - \$149,999, 9 = \$150,000 - \$199,999, and 10 = \$200,000 or more).

(4) Values are represented by two values dimensions: a continuum of traditional values versus secular-rational values, and a continuum of survival values versus self-expression values (e.g., Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Baker 2005). These are the first and second components from a factor analysis of the 10 items in Table 1, over all the nations in the World Values Surveys plus the DAS, following the same procedure used by others (e.g., Inglehart and Baker 2000, Inglehart and Norris 2003, Norris and Inglehart 2004; Baker 2005).

(5) Political ideology is indicated by choices on a conservative-liberal scale, where 1 = very conservative, 2 = moderately conservative, 3 = middle of the road, 4 =

moderately liberal, and 5 = very liberal. This variable is reversed coded in the analysis, so that higher scores indicate a more conservative political ideology. We also use a dichotomous measure of political ideology, where 1 = very or moderately conservative, 0 = middle of the road to very liberal.

Control Variables

The control variables include age, gender, and marital status. Three dummy variables are used for age: youth (1 = ages 18 – 25; 0 = ages 26+), middle age (1 = ages 26 – 54; 0 = ages 18 – 25, 55+), and older (1 = 56 +; 0 = other). The older age group is the omitted category. Gender is a dichotomous variable, where 1 = female and 0 = male. Married is a dichotomous variable, where 1 = married now, 0 = not married now. In the models predicting voting behavior, we also include party identification (defined above) as a control variable.

POLITICAL BEHAVIOR IN THE DETROIT REGION: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Race looms large in the Detroit region. Compared to nonblacks, African Americans were more likely to have voted in the 2000 elections, controlling for other factors (Table 2). African Americans were considerably less likely to have voted for Bush, compared to nonblacks (H1). This finding from the Detroit region is consistent with the general pattern nationwide for black voters to support Democratic candidates. Similarly, African Americans are much less likely to identify as Republican, controlling for other factors.

The lack of support among black voters for Bush does not appear to vary by political ideology. For example, conservative and nonconservative black voters exhibit similar low levels of support for Bush (Figure 1). Political ideology does matter for nonblack voters, with almost 80 percent of conservative nonblacks voting for Bush and only 33 percent of nonblacks who were not conservative voting for Bush. Thus, the significant relationship of political ideology in the regression models (Table 2) appears to be limited to nonblacks.

Contrary to expectations (H2), formal education is not significantly associated with choice of presidential candidate in the 2000 elections, controlling for other factors (Table 2). It is also not significantly associated with the likelihood of identifying as Republican, holding constant other factors. Also contrary to expectations (H3), household income is not significantly related to the chances of voting for Bush in the 2000 elections, controlling for other factors, but it is significantly related to identifying as Republican (Table 2). It is interesting to note that the size of the effect of economic cleavages on choice of presidential vote in the Detroit region is about the same as the size of the effect nationwide. As shown in Figure 2, the difference in Democratic presidential vote between the lower and upper income thirds is about 8.1 points. (This difference is calculated as the percent voting Democratic minus the percent voting Republican between the lower and upper incomes thirds.) This is virtually the same as the magnitude of the effect of economic cleavages in the country as a whole (see Figure 6.4 in Fiorina with Abrams and Pope 2005:72).

Despite the findings of other studies, differences in education and differences in household income for evangelicals do not appear to influence choice of presidential

candidate (H4 and H5). Evangelical Protestants in the Detroit region who have high levels of formal education (some college or more) are about as likely as those who have low levels of formal education (high school degree or less) to have voted for Bush in the 2000 elections (Figure 3). Similarly, Evangelical Protestants in the Detroit region who have high income levels (\$50,000 or more) are about as likely as those who have low income levels (less than \$50,000) to have voted for Bush in the 2000 elections (Figure 4).

The observed effects of religious affiliation and religious behavior on voting and party identification are contrary to expectations (H6 – H9). For example, compared to mainline Protestants, evangelical Protestants in the Detroit region are neither more nor less likely to have voted for Bush, or to identify as Republican, controlling for other factors (Table 2). Similarly, compared to mainline Protestants, Catholics in the Detroit region are neither more nor less likely to have voted for Bush, or to identify as Republican, controlling for other factors (Table 2). Compared to mainline Protestants, secularists (those without a religious affiliation) are more likely to have voted for Bush, and to identify as Republican, but only when we control for all other variables; if we omit the two values scales, these effects are not significant (Table 2). Frequency of attendance at religious services does influence the likelihood of voting in the first place, but it does not significantly influence the chances of voting for Bush or identifying as a Republican, holding other factors constant. Also contrary to expectations (H10), African Americans who frequently attend religious services are about as unlikely to vote for Bush or identify as Republican as are African Americans who do not attend religious services frequently—though there is a small difference (Figure 5). These contrary findings may

be due to the overwhelming effect in the Detroit area of race on political behavior (see, for example, Figure 2).

Before we examine the effects of values, it is helpful to place the Detroit region in context. The two values dimensions—traditional versus secular values and survival versus self-expression values—can be used to create a global map of values, as shown in Figure 7. This map combines data on about 80 nations from the World Values Surveys with the 2003 Detroit Area Study. As shown, the U.S. has an exceptional mix of traditional values and self-expression values. Indeed, no nation in any of the four waves of the World Values Surveys has been more traditional and more self-expression oriented than the U.S. (Baker, 2005). The Detroit region is located near the U.S. average, but it is both more traditional and more survival oriented than the U.S., reflecting the region's difficult economic situation and extreme racial segregation (Farley, Danziger, and Holzer, 2000; Baker and Coleman, 2004). Of course, there is variation in values within the Detroit region and the nation. Figure 8 shows how values vary by religious affiliation in the region. As should be expected, seculars (no religious affiliation) have less traditional values than the members of any religious affiliation. Evangelical Protestants are the most traditional and the most survival oriented of all.

As expected (H11), traditional versus secular-rational values are significantly related to presidential vote and party identification. The more traditional a person's values are, the more likely the person voted for Bush in the 2000 election, controlling for other factors (Table 2). Similarly, the more traditional a person's values are, the more likely the person identifies as Republican.

Survival/self-expression values are significantly related to the likelihood of having voted in the 2000 elections, as expected (H12). The more self-expression oriented a person's values are, the more likely the person voted in the 2000 elections, controlling for other factors (Table 2). This finding is consistent with the findings from other studies that people with self-expression values have higher levels of political participation, compared to those with survival values (Baker 2005; Inglehart and Baker 2000).

Taken together, these findings indicate that “values voters” are real phenomena in the three-county Detroit region. There is a significant tendency for voters with traditional values to vote for Bush, controlling for the effects of religious affiliation, frequency of attendance at religious services, race, socioeconomic class, political ideology, party identification, age, gender, and marital status. But how important are values? Are values more important than, say, income or race or religiosity? Figure 2 provides a basis for comparison. The difference in Democratic presidential vote based on income is small, as noted above—a difference of only 8.1 points between the upper and lower income thirds. In recent elections, the difference in Democratic presidential vote between the upper and lower income thirds has been roughly the same as the difference between regular churchgoers and those who never attend religious services; in the 2000 elections, however, the difference for religious differences (based on frequency of attendance) was twice as big as the difference for income thirds (Fiorina with Abrams and Pope 2005:71).² The pattern in the Detroit region for the 2000 election was the same as the national pattern for the same election: the difference in Democratic presidential vote was 15.8 points, almost twice as large as the economic difference (8.1 points). The effect of race is glaring: The

² We calculated differences in Democratic presidential vote using the same method and definitions of measures as Fiorina with Abrams and Pope (2005:66-72).

difference in Democratic presidential vote between blacks and nonblacks was 35.7 points, much larger than the difference for religious differences or economic cleavages. Finally, the effect of values is either the strongest of all or second only to race, depending on how it is measured. If we compare the difference in Democratic presidential vote for those above the mean score with those below the mean score on the traditional versus secular-rational scale, we find that the difference is large: 24.4 points. This is considerable larger than the difference for religious differences (15.8) or economic cleavages (8.1) but less than the difference for race (35.7). But values are more important than any factor if we compare the extreme traditionalists and the extreme secular-rationalists (defined, respectively, as one standard deviation below the mean and one standard deviation above the mean). As shown in Figure 2, the difference is enormous: 48 points.

However, Bush lost the Detroit region (and, as a result, the state of Michigan) in 2000, so “values voters” were not enough to swing the region (or state) in his favor. The effect of “values voters” depends on a variety of factors, including the proportion of the electorate with shared values, how motivated they are to turnout and vote, and how strongly their values visions influence choice of presidential candidate, compared to other factors. However, other factors matter and cancel or counterbalance these advantages. For example, race remains a big predictor of political behavior in the Detroit region. Blacks are more likely to turn out and voted, compared to nonblacks, and they are much less likely than nonblacks to vote for Bush. Finally, voters with traditional values are more likely to vote for Bush, but this is only a tendency—not all of them did vote for

Bush. These are some of the reasons why “values voters” did not swing the regional election in favor of Bush.

CONCLUSION

The controversy about the role of “values voters” is an indication of fundamental questions about the changing social bases of political behavior. American politics appears to be becoming more cultural and less social structural. This study contributes to research on the cultural or “values” bases of political behavior by employing two values scales that have been well-tested in research on values in America and in cultures around the world. The findings show that “values voters” are not a myth, though their impact may have been exaggerated. In the three-county Detroit region, there is a significant tendency for those with self-expression values to turnout and vote, compared to those with survival values, controlling for other factors. Voters with traditional values tend to vote for Bush and to identify as Republican, controlling for other factors. Values and race are stronger predictors of presidential vote than religiosity or income. However, Bush lost the Detroit region (and Michigan) in 2000. “Values voters” were not enough to swing the region in his favor.

This study shows that “better measures” of values (Layman 1997:307) can improve the understanding of the cultural bases of political behavior and attitudes in general, and the phenomena of “values voters” in particular. Including an even broader and deeper array of values in future surveys might further illuminate the role “values voters” actually play in American politics.

References

- Abramowitz, Alan I. 1995. "It's Abortion, Stupid: Policy Voting in the 1992 Presidential Election." *The Journal of Politics* 57:176-186.
- Achterberg, Peter. 2006. "Class Voting in the New Political Culture: Economic, Cultural, and Environmental Voting in 20 Western Countries." *International Sociology* 21:237-261.
- Ajzen, Icek. 2001. "Nature and Operation of Attitudes." *Annual Review of Psychology* 52: 27-58.
- Ashbee, Edward. 2005. "The 2004 Presidential Election, 'Moral Values', and the Democrats' Dilemma." *The Political Quarterly* 76: 209–217.
- Baker, Wayne. 2005. *America's Crisis of Values: Reality and Perception*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Baker, Wayne E., and Kenneth M. Coleman. 2004. "Racial Segregation and the Digital Divide in the Detroit Metroplotian Region." Pp249-268 in *The Network Society: A Cross-Cultural Perspective*, edited by M. Castells. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Baker, Wayne and Melissa Forbes. 2006. "Moral Values and Market Attitudes." *Society* (January/February):23-26.
- Baker, Wayne and Amaney Jamal. 2007. "Values, Formative Experiences, and Intergroup Contact." Chapter 4 in Baker et al., *Citizenship and Crisis*. NY: Russell Sage Foundation Press.

- Bartle, John. 1998. "Left-Right Position Matters, But Does Social Class? Causal Models of the 1992 British General Election." *British Journal of Political Science* 28: 501-529.
- Belli, Robert F., Michael W. Traugott, Margaret Young, and Katherine A. McGonagle. 1999. "Reducing Vote Over-reporting in Surveys: Social Desirability, Memory Failure, and Source Monitoring." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 63:90-108.
- Bolce, Louis and Gerald de Maio. 1999a. "Religious Outlook, Culture War Politics, and Antipathy Toward Christian Fundamentalists." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 63:29-61.
- _____. 1999b. "The Anti-Christian Fundamentalist Factor in Contemporary Politics." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 63:508-542.
- Bowler, Shaun, Stephen P. Nicholson, and Gary M. Segura. 2006. Earthquakes and Aftershocks: Race, Direct Democracy, and Partisan Change. *American Journal of Political Science* 50:146-159.
- Brewer, Paul R. and Clyde Wilcox. 2005. "Same Sex Marriage and Civil Unions." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 69:599-616.
- Brooks, Clem and Jeff Manza. 2004. "A Great Divide? Religion and Political Change in U.S. National Elections 1972-2000." *The Sociological Quarterly* 45:421-450.
- Campbell, David E. 2006. "Religious 'Threat' in Contemporary Presidential Elections" *The Journal of Politics* 68:104-115.
- Carmines, Edward G., and James A. Stimson. 1989. *Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- Clemens, Judi, Mick P. Couper, and Kathy Powers. 2002. *The Detroit Area Study: Celebrating 50 Years*. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan.
- Craig, Stephen C. Michael D. Martinez, James G. Kane, and Jason Gainous. 2005. "Core Values, Value Conflict, and Citizen's Ambivalence about Gay Rights." *Political Research Quarterly* 58: 5-17
- Davis, Nancy J. and Robert V. Robinson. 1996. "Are the Rumors of War Exaggerated?" *American Journal of Sociology* 102.
- de la Garza, Rodolfo O., and Jeronimo Cortina. 2007. "Are Latinos Republicans but Just Don't Know It?" *American Politics Research* 35:202-223.
- Detroit Area Study. 2001. Distribution of Findings by County. Retrieved March 31 (<http://www.tcaup.umich.edu/workfolio/DAS2001/findings/WebDistributionbyCounty.html>)
- Devos, Thierry, Dario Spini, and Shalom H. Schwartz. 2002. "Conflicts Among Human Values and Trust in Institutions." *British Journal of Social Psychology* 41: 481-494.
- Evans, Geoffrey. 2000. "The Continued Significance of Class Voting." *Annual Review of Political Science* 3:401-417.
- Farley, Reynolds, Sheldon Danzinger, and Harry J. Holzer. 2000. *Detroit Divided*. NY: Russell Sage Foundation Press.
- Fiorina, Morris, Samuel J. Abrams and Jeremy C. Pope 2005. *Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America*. NY: Pearson Longman.
- _____. 2006. *Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America (2nd ed.)* New York: Pearson Education.

- Fogel, Robert William. 2000. *The Fourth Great Awakening and the Future of Egalitarianism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Greeley, Andrew, and Michael Hout. 2006. *The Truth About Christian Conservatives*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Hillygus, D. Sunshine and Todd G. Shields. 2005. "Moral Issues and Voter Decision Making in the 2004 Presidential Election." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 38(2): 201-210.
- Himmelfarb, Gertrude. 2001. *One Nation, Two Cultures*. NY: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Hout, Michael, Clem Brooks, and Jeff Manza. 1995. "The Democratic Class Struggle in the United States, 1948-1992." *American Sociological Review* 60:805-828.
- Hunter, James Davison. 1991. *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America*. NY: Basic.
- Hutchings, Vincent L. and Nicholas A. Valentino. 2004. "The Centrality of Race in American Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 7:383-408.
- Inglehart, Ronald. 1997. *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, Ronald and Wayne E. Baker. 2000. "Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values." *American Sociological Review* 65:19-51.
- Inglehart, Ronald and Pippa Norris. 2003. *Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Kellstedt, Lyman A., John C. Green, James L. Guth, and Corwin E. Smidt. 1996. "Religious Voting Blocks in the 1992 Election: The Year of the Evangelical?" Pp267-290 in *Religion and the Culture Wars: Dispatches from the Front*, edited

- by J.C. Green, J.L. Guth, C.E. Smidt, and L.A. Kellstedt. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Kellstedt, Lyman A., Corwin E. Smidt, and Paul M. Kellstedt. 1991. "Religious Tradition, Denomination, and Commitment: White Protestants and the 1988 Election." Pp139-158 in *The Bible and the Ballot Box: Religion and Politics in the 1988 Election*, edited by J.L. Guth and J. C. Green. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Kingdon, John W. 1999. *America the Unusual*. NY: St. Martin's/ Worth.
- Klinkner, Phillip A. 2006. "Mr Bush's War: Foreign Policy in the 2004 Election." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36:281-296.
- Kohut, Andrew, John C. Green, Scott Keeter, and Robert C. Toth. 2000. *The Diminishing Divide: Religion's Changing Role in American Politics*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Langer, Gary and Jon Cohen. 2005. "Voters and Values in the 2004 Election." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 69:744-759.
- Layman, Geoffrey. 1997. "Religion and Political Behavior in the United States: The Impact of Beliefs, Affiliations, and Commitment from 1980 to 1994." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 61:288-316.
- _____. 1999. "'Culture Wars' in the American Party System: Religious and Cultural Change Among Partisan Activists Since 1972" *American Politics Quarterly* 27:89-121.
- _____. 2001. *The Great Divide: Religious Cultural Conflict in American Party Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.

- Layman, Geoffrey and Edward G. Carmines. 1997. "Cultural Conflict in American Politics: Religious Traditionalism, Postmaterialism, and U.S. Political Behavior." *The Journal of Politics* 59:751-777.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1996. *American Exceptionalism*. NY: W. W. Norton.
- Lovett, Benjamin J. and Alexander H. Jordan. 2005. "Moral Values, Moralism, and the 2004 Presidential Election." *Analysis of Social Issues and Public Policy* 5:165-175.
- Manza, Jeff, Michael Hout, and Clem Brooks. 1995. "Class Voting in Capitalist Democracies Since World War II: Dealignment, Realignment, or Trendless Fluctuation?" *Annual Review of Sociology* 21:137-162.
- Manza, Jeff and Clem Brooks. 1997. "The Religious Factor in U.S. Presidential Elections." *American Journal of Sociology* 103:38-81.
- Moore, David W. 2004. "Moral Values Important in the 2004 Exit Polls." *Polltalk*, December 7. The Gallup Organization.
- Muste, Christopher. 2004. "Hidden in Plain Sight: Polling Data Show Moral Values Aren't a New Factor." *Washington Post*, December 12:B4.
- Nadeau, Richard, Richard G. Niemi, Harold W. Stanley and Jean-François Godbout. 2004. "Class, Party and South/Non-South Differences: An Update." *American Politics Research*. 32:52-67.
- Norris, Pippa and Ronald Inglehart. 2004. *Sacred and Secular*. Cambridge University Press.
- Pew Hispanic Center. 2006. *Latinos and the 2006 Mid-term Election*. Retrieved March 23, 2007 (<http://pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/26.pdf>)

- Pew Research Center. 2006. Election '06: *Big Changes in Some Key Groups*. Retrieved March 23, 2007 (<http://pewresearch.org/pubs/93/election-06-big-changes-in-some-key-groups>)
- Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life. 2006a. *Pragmatic Americans Liberal and Conservative on Social Issues*. Retrieved March 20, 2007 (<http://pewforum.org/docs/index.php?DocID=150>)
- Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life. 2006b. *Religion and the 2006 Elections*. Retrieved March 20, 2007 (<http://pewforum.org/docs/index.php?DocID=174>)
- Putnam, Robert D. 2000. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. NY: Simon & Schuster.
- Shuman, Howard. 2006. "The Validity of the 2004 'Moral Values' Question." *The Forum* 4:article 5. The Berkeley Electronic Press.
- Schwartz, Shalom. H. 1992. "Universals in the Content and Structure of Values - Theoretical Advances and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries." *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 25: 1-65
- _____. 1994. "Are There Universal Aspects in the Structure and Content of Human Values?" *Journal of Social Issues* 50: 19-45.
- Schwartz, Shalom H. & Wolfgang Bilsky. 1987. Toward a universal psychological structure of human values. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 53, 550-562.
- _____. 1990. Toward a theory of the universal content and structure of values: Extensions and cross-cultural replications. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 58 878.

Stonecash, Jeffrey M., Mark D. Brewer, P. Eric Petersen, Mary P. McGuire, and Lori

Beth May. 2000. "Class and Party: Secular Realignment and the Survival of

Democrats Outside the South." *Political Research Quarterly* 53: 731-752.

Tamney, Joseph B., Stephen D. Johnson, and Ronald Burton. 1992. "The Abortion

Controversy: Conflicting Beliefs and Values in American Society. *Journal for the*

Scientific Study of Religion 31: 32-46.

Thompson, Heather Ann. 1999. Rethinking the Politics of White Flight in the Postwar

City: Detroit, 1945-1980. *Journal of Urban History* 25: 163-198.

Valentino, Nicholas A., and David O. Sears. 2005. "Old Times There are Not Forgotten:

Race and Partisan Realignment in the Contemporary South." *American Journal of*

Political Science 49: 672-688.

Woodberry, Robert D, and Christian S. Smith. 1998. "Fundamentalism et al:

Conservative Protestants in America." *Annual Review of Sociology* 24:25-56.

Figure 1. Presidential Vote in 2000 General Election by Race and Political Ideology






Figure 2. Difference in Democratic Presidential Vote Between Blacks and Nonblacks, Regular Church Goers and Non-Attendees, Lower and Upper Income Thirds, and Traditionalists and Secular-Rationalists




Note: Difference in presidential vote is calculated as the percent Democratic minus percent Republican between the respective categories. (See text for definitions of categories.)

Figure 3. Presidential Vote in 2000 General Election by Evangelical Protestant Religious Affiliation and Education




Note: High education = some college or more; low education = high school degree or less.

Figure 4. Presidential Vote in 2000 General Election by Evangelical Protestant Religious Affiliation and Household Income



Note: High income = \$50,000 or more; low income = less than \$50,000.

Figure 5. Presidential Vote in 2000 General Election by Race and Religious Affiliation



Note: Respondents who are “secular” (no religious affiliation) are excluded.

Figure 6. Presidential Vote in 2000 General Election by Race and Frequency of Attendance at Religious Services




Figure 7. Global Map of Values: World Values Surveys and Detroit Area Study




Figure 8. Religious Affiliation, Traditional/Secular-Rational Values, and Survival/Self-Expression Values in the Detroit Region, 2003 Detroit Area Study.




Table 1. The Components of Two Values Scales: Results from Factor Analysis

	Factor	
	1	2
<i>Traditional vs. Secular-Rational Values</i>		
TRADITIONAL VALUES EMPHASIZE THE FOLLOWING:		
Abortion is never justifiable	.670	-.253
It is more important for a child to learn obedience and religious than independence and determination [Autonomy index]	.656	-.122
God is very important in respondent's life	.638	-.057
Respondent favors more respect for authority	.469	-.093
Respondent has strong sense of national pride	.452	.241
(SECULAR-RATIONAL VALUES EMPHASIZE THE OPPOSITE)		
<i>Survival vs. Self-Expression Values</i>		
SURVIVAL VALUES EMPHASIZE THE FOLLOWING:		
Respondent describes self as not very happy	.274	.592
You have to be very careful about trusting people	-.007	.569
Homosexuality is never justifiable	-.526	.497
Respondent gives priority to economic and physical security over expression and quality of life [4-item Materialist/Postmaterialist Index]	.129	.378
Respondent has not and would not sign a petition	-.114	.371
(SELF-EXPRESSION VALUES EMPHASIZE THE OPPOSITE)		

Note. The original polarities vary. The above statements show how each item relates to a given dimension, based on factor analysis with varimax rotation, using individual-level data from all nations in the World Values Surveys plus the DAS. This follows the same procedure used by Inglehart and Baker (2000), Inglehart and Norris (2003), Norris and Inglehart (2004), and Baker (2005).

Table 2. Binary logit coefficients from regression of voting behavior and party identification on religious affiliation and behavior, race, socioeconomic class, values, and political ideology, controlling for sociodemographic variables, 2003 Detroit Area Study.

Independent Variables	Voted in 2000 election		Voted for Bush in 2000 election		Identify as Republican	
<i>Religious Affiliation and Behavior</i>						
Evangelical Protestant	-1.000*	-.800	-.556	-.651	.392	.478
	(.461)	(.512)	(.588)	(.657)	(.456)	(.504)
Catholic	-.151	.007	.177	.206	-.230	-.093
	(.428)	(.470)	(.452)	(.506)	(.368)	(.408)
Other religion	-.971	-.674	1.166*	1.753*	.148	.260
	(.465)	(.534)	(.561)	(.659)	(.445)	(.505)
Secular	-.093	.233	.900	1.410*	.658	1.499**
	(.542)	(.595)	(.659)	(.714)	(.526)	(.598)
Frequency of attendance at religious services	.384***	.558***	.189	-.053	.140	.084
	(.101)	(.120)	(.118)	(.139)	(.096)	(.114)
<i>Race</i>						
Black	.943**	1.235**	-1.661***	-2.168***	-3.042***	-2.980***
	(.364)	(.419)	(.491)	(.564)	(.690)	(.712)
<i>Socioeconomic Class</i>						
Education	.330*	.394*	-.046	.048	-.153	-.064
	(.133)	(.157)	(.155)	(.178)	(.129)	(.144)
Household income	.162	.072	-.138	-.101	.243**	.185*
	(.071)	(.082)	(.090)	(.103)	(.078)	(.087)
<i>Values</i>						
Traditional/Secular Values		.148		-.837**		-.703**
		(.223)		(.295)		(.250)
Survival/Self-Expression Values		.808***		-.359		-.571**
		(.217)		(.272)		(.220)
<i>Political Ideology</i>						
Liberal-Conservative scale	-.053	.034	1.128***	1.247***	1.071***	1.078***
	(.148)	(.167)	(.221)	(.253)	(.177)	(.200)
<i>Party Identification</i>						
Republican	.571	.332	3.059***	2.808***		
	(.376)	(.402)	(.453)	(.482)		
<i>Control</i>						

<i>Variables</i>						
Youth	-1.493**	-1.654**	-1.059	-.609	-.250	.131
	(.540)	(.602)	(1.028)	(1.070)	(.530)	(.576)
Middle age	-.391	-.451	.326	.589	.381	.534
	(.310)	(.352)	(.346)	(.385)	(.309)	(.339)
Gender (female)	-.655**	-.898**	.096	.016	-.219	-.452
	(.275)	(.312)	(.342)	(.402)	(.266)	(.297)
Married now	.394	.289	.046	-.194	.568	.532
	(.292)	(.320)	(.347)	(.380)	(.298)	(.315)
<i>Constant</i>	1.371	2.022*	3.432***	2.832*	.705	-.279
	(.819)	(.976)	(1.028)	(1.184)	(.784)	(.060)
- 2 Log-likelihood	384.27	322.26	263.51	220.63	377.08	320.31
N of observations	451	387	329	293	483	423
Nagelkerke	.260	.322	.564	.602	.339	.401
Pseudo R sq.						

Notes:

p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Standard errors are in parentheses.

Omitted category for religion is Mainline Protestant.

Total sample size for 2003 Detroit Area Study = 508. Respondents who were not U.S. citizens or who were younger than 18 in 2000 are excluded from the models estimating voting. Those did not vote are excluded from models estimating voted for Bush.